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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
-vs- ) 
RONALD ALBERT ABRAM,aka 
Ronald A. Rasmussen, 
Defendants-Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) 
) 
) 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12609 
This is a Bastardy Action brought 
pursuant to the Bastardy Act 77-60-1 et. seq. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) as Amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Criminal suit was filed against Defen-
dant-Appellant for the crime of Bastardy. 
Trial by jury was held before the Honorable 
-2-
Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Utah, at 
St. George, Washington County, State of 
Utah. Defendant-Appellant was found quilty 
of the crime of Bastardy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests the 
Court to set aside his conviction for the 
crime of Bastardy on the grounds that in 
light of the Uniform Act on Paternity Appel-
lant was denied equal protection of the law 
by being subjected to criminal procedures 
before trial and a civil standard of proof 
during trial; that sections 1, 2, and 3 of 
the Bastardy Act 77-60 U.C.A. (1953) as amen-
ded have been repealed by implication by the 
Uniform Act on Paternity 78-45a et. seq. 
U.C.A. (1953); that evidence of prosecutrix's 
opportunity to get pregnant by other men was 
erroneously limited to a one month period; 
and that a document purporting to prove 
-3-
Appellant's guilt was erroneously admitted 
into evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ronald Albert Abram, Appellant, was 
charged with the crime of Bastardy. A com-
plaint was made by the prosecutrix, a summons 
was issued and served, Appellant was placed 
under arrest and arrangement proceedings held. 
On February 12, 1971 the Respondent sub-
mitted a bill of particulars persuant to 77- 1 ~ 
21-9, U.C.A. (1953). On March 2, 1971 Appel-
lants Attorney filed a motion to suppress the 
introduction of a typewritten, unsigned letter 1 
alleged by respondent to have been written by 
the Appellant. By order of the court dated 
March 17, 1971, Appellant's motion to suppress ~ 
was overruled. 
Trial by jury was held before the Honor-
able Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Utah, at 
St. George, Washington County, State of Utah, 
-4-
on April 14, 1971~ During trial, Appellant's 
attorney objected to the Court's ruling that 
the period of gestation be confined to a one 
month period. Also, Appellant's attorney ob-
jected to jury instructions numbered 2, 3 and 
4 upon the grounds that Appellant was being 
subjected to both criminal and civil procedureE 
in the same cause of action which violated the 
14th amendment right of equal protection, becausE 
others in his class are subject to wholly civil 
procedures of the Uniform Act on Paternity, ana: 
in light of the Uniform Act on Paternity, the 
provisions of the Bastardy Act providing for 
criminal procedures are repealed by implication 
On April 15, 1971 Appellant was found 
guilty of the crime of Bastardy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN LIGHT OF THE MORE RECENTLY 
PASSED UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
78-45a-l et. seq., UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED (1953) PROSECUTION OF THE 
BASTARDY ACT 77-60-1 et. seq., U. 
C.A. (1953) AS AMENDED CONSTITUTES 
A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
THE LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOUR-
-5-
TEENTH AMENTIMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
A. The right of equal protection of 
Appellant was violated by subjecting him to 
both criminal and civil procedures in the 
same cause of action while others in his 
class are subject to the wholly civil proce-
dures of the Uniform Act on Paternity. 
Therefore Appellant specifically objects to 
sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Bastardy Act which 
provide for criminal procedure before trial 
in the complaint, warrant, arrest and bail 
procedures. 
77-60-1 provides: 
"Arrest of father on Complaint of 
mother when an unmarried female pregnant 
or delivered of a child, which by law 
will be deemed a bastard shall make com-
plaint to the Justice of the Peace in 
the County where she may be so pregnant 
or delivered, or where the person accused 
may be found, and shall accuse, u~der 
oath or affirmation, the person with 
being the father of such child, it shall 
be the duty of such Justice to issue a 
warrant against the person so accu~ed 
and cause him to be brought forthwith 
before him, or, in his absence, before 
any other Justice of the Peace of such 
County." 
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77-60-2 provides: 
"Binding over to District Court. Upon 
appearance of the Defendant, it shall be 
~he duty of the County Attorney to exam-
ine the woman under oath or affirmation 
before the Justice and in the presence of 
the Defendant touching the charge against 
him. The Defendant shall have the right 
to controvert such charge, and evidence 
shall be heard as in other cases. If the 
Justice shall be of the opinion that 
there is probably cause to believe that 
the Defendant is the father of such bas-
tard, it shall be his duty to bind the 
Defendant, with sufficient surety, to 
appear before the District Court and an-
swer such charge as in other cases. If 
the Defendant shall neglect or refuse to 
give bond as security as aforesaid, the 
Justice shall cause him to be committed 
to the jail of ti:1e County." 
77-60-3 provides: 
"For an information to be filed with 
the District Court, of criminal proceed-
ings." 
All three of these sections were applied 
to Appellant and are criminal in nature. 77-
60-1 provides for a complaint by the mother 
to the Justice of the Peace with issuance of 
warrant and the making of the arrest follow-
ing. 77-60-2 provides that probable cause 
must be shown. 77-60-3 provides that an infor 
mation is to be filed in the District Court.On 
the other hand, Section 78-45a-5 of the Unifor 
·" 
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Act on Paternity, supra, gives the District 
Court jurisdiction to determine rights and 
obligations of the parties. 78-45a-2 says 
that all that is necessary to start the ac-
tion is for the mother, child, or agency, who 
having expended money on the child, have an 
action against the father, to file a Petition 
with the Court alleging such paternity, and 
requesting the appropriate remedy. In other 
words, the process is wholly civil in nature. 
In order to have equal protection of th( .. 
law, "they have to affect allike all persons u 
similarly situated." State vs. Shondel, 23 
Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 146 (1969). Citing 
McDonald D. vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
180 U.S. 311 21 S.C. 389, 45 1. ed. 542. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case oi;.' 
State vs. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 
1075 (1959) at 317, stated: 
"We agree that (referring to the pro-
position that the prosecutor shall not 
be given a choice of whether to pro~eed 
under a felony statute or under a mis-
demeanor statute under the same set of 
facts) this may tend to deny to Defen-
dant and others of his class equal 
-8-
protection of the laws if the same iden-
tical facts may be used in prosecutions 
under two completely integrated statutes 
II 
The facts in the Twitchell case did not 
support that thesis. The Court determined tha 
the felony of automobile homicide was taken ou 
of the old act, therefore there was no overlap· 
ping of the two statutes. In this case there 
is no such distinction. Both acts are designe 
to compel a natural father to contribute to-
wards the support of his offspring. They both_., 
provide basically the same test, remedies, etcu 
except for the process of getting into Court. 
Both acts provide for support and maintenance 
of the child, expenses of pregnancy, and educa 
tion of the child. 77-60-7, 78-45a-5. 
There is a four year statute of limi tatio,: 
on back support, 77-60-15, 78-45a-3. Sections 
18 to 23 of the Bastardy Act provide for blood 
tests and the procedure involved is essentiall 
the same as those provided for in the Uniform 
Act on Paternity, 78-45a-7 to 10. 
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There are differences in the two acts, 
to wit: 
1. 78-25-19 limits the number of quali-
fied examiners to three (3) whereas 78-45a-8 
has no limitation on the number of examiners. 
2. 78-45a-8 provides that a party may 
demand that other experts perform other tests; 
78-25-19 is silent as to the point. 
3. 78-25-22 provides that the Court may 
resolve the question of paternity against the 
party who will not submit to the test; the Uni-. 
form Act on Paternity has no similar provision: 
Admittably these differences are techni-
cal however, both acts may be invoked against 
the same person upon the same set of facts, 
thus the Appellant was sub,j ect to prosecution 
for the same identical facts under two complet.'. 
ely integrated statutes. 
B. In Griffin vs. Illinois 351 U.S. 12, 
100 1. ed. 891 (1956) at 18 the Court said: 
"Consequently at all stages of the 
proceedings the due process and equa~ 
protection claus~s ~r?tect ~ers?n~ like 
petitioner from 1nv1d1~us·d1scr1m1na-
tion." 
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At the point of proceedings which Appel-
lant is objecting, that is the incongruous use 
of criminal procedure before trial and a civil ! 
standard of proof during trial, there is a de-
nial of equal protection. 
Presecution of the Bastardy Act allows th , 
prosecutrix to go to the County attorney in-
stead of a private attorney, as a result, 
Appellant was sought out by warrant, arrested 
and forced to post bail in order to stay out 
of jail. This would not have occured if Appel· : 
lant were prosecuted under the Uniform Act on 
Praternity. Thus, Appellant was not treated 
alike with other members of his class nor was 
he protected at all stages of the proceedings 
from invidious discrimination. 
C.· Further, since an action to determine 
paternity is civil in nature, Appellant should 
not have been prosecuted under the Bastardy 
Act which provided for criminal procedures to 
be followed in the making of the complaint, 
issuing the warrant, making the arrest and 
posting bail. 
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"~he q1:1-estion is no longer an open 
one in this Jurisdiction. That these 
proceedings though criminal in form 
are, in their nature and in the obj~ct 
sought, civil, has been the settled 
law in this State since the case of 
State vs. Reeves, 43 Utah 447, 135 P. 
270, which was followed and approved 
in the case of State vs. Hammond, 46 
Utah 249,148 P.420 and State vs. An-
derson, 63 Utah 171, 224 P. 442, 40a 
A.L.R. 94. In our opinion the fore-
going cases are _conclusive upon the 
questions presented by_ such assign-
ments of error." State vs. Knight, 
76 Utah 514, 290 P. 774 (1930). 
The decisions of the Court have consis-
tently declared that civil, not criminal, 
rules would be followed in Bastardy proceed-
ings. In the case of State vs. Reeves, supra, 
the question as to the quantum of proof re-
quired to establish the paternity of the child 
was held by the Court to be a preponderance of 
the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Again in State vs. Anderson, supra, the Court 
held that the purpose of the proceedings in 
the Bastardy Act was not to inflict punishment 
by imprisonment, but to compel the father to 
support the bastard child during the tender 
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years; therefore, the action was determined 
to be civil in nature and not criminal. Fur-
ther, in State vs. Kranendonk, supra, the 
Court held that the Defendant in that case 
was not entitled to a motion in arrest of 
judgment because the proceedings being civil 
and not criminal did not entitle him to that 
motion. 
In the cases cited, an issue of whether 
civil or criminal procedure rules would be 
utilized was involved. In all instances, the 
Civil Rules of Procedure were deemed to be 
proper by the Utah Court. Based upon the hold· 
ings of the Court cited, it is clear that the 
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the bastardy' 
action brought against Appellant. Therefore, 
Appellant was denied the right of equal protec· 
tion of the law in that he was prosecuted in 
a civil action under criminal rules of proce-
dures. 
The Appellant asks that he be given the 
right of equal protection of the law. The 
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Court has consistently held that all persons 
in a class must be treated alike. Appellant 
is not treated alike with others who are pro-
secuted under the Uniform Act on Paternity. 
Thus Appellant was not afforded his right of ,. 
equal protection when prosecuted under the 
Bastardy Act; therefore, the Appellant request'. 
that Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Bastardy Act, ~ 
supra, be declared violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
POINT II 
THE BASTARDY ACT 77-60 SECTION 
1, 2 and 3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953) AS AMENDED, HAS BEEN RE-
PEALED BY IMPLICATION BY THE UN-
FORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-l 
et. seq., U.C.A. (1953) 
A. The criminal procedure utilized in 
the Bastardy Act is so repugnant to the new 
act that those provisions become repealed by 
implication. The two acts, the Ba~tardy Act 
and the Uniform Act on Paternity, are sub-
stantially the same. The most significant 
difference is the arrest and arraignment pro-
-14-
visions in the Bastardy Act. 
1. In Utah, the rule of construction is 
that where there are two acts covering the same 
subject matter, they will both stand, absent a · 
-serious conflict. In State vs. Shondel, supra,' 
the Court states: 
" ... the generally recognized rule 
that where there is a conflict between 
two legislative acts, the latest act 
will ordinarily prevail." 
To be impliedly repealed, the offensive 
act must have been passed by the legislature 
prior to the other dCt. The Bastardy Act was 
originally passed in 1911 and has passed down 
through the years in about the same form. The 
Uniform Act on Paternity was passed in 1965. 
The Uniform Paternity Act, based upon the 
Court's holding in Shondel, supra, prevails 
over the Bastardy Act, where the provisions of . 
the two acts are in conflict. 
2. In addition to the time sequence, 
there must be irreconcible conflict. The 
Court stated in Glenn B. Farrell, 5 Utah 2d 
439, 30 P. 2d 380 (1965): 
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"In order for a latter inactment 
t? take presidence over a prior one 
without expressly repealing it there 
must be irreconcible conflict.' .. " 
In the Glenn case the Court found that 
irreconcible conflict did not exist. The 
Court relied on proper statutory construction 
that requires that the Statutes be harmonized 
whenever possible. It is impossible to harm-
onize the criminal process in the Bastardy 
Act with the civil process of the Uniform 
Paternity Act. The irreconcible conflict 
arises from those provisions of the Bastardy 
Act which provides for a complaint, warrant, 
arrest, binding over and for an information 
to be filed. All of these are criminal pro-
cedures. 
The Uniform Act on Paternity eliminates 
criminal procedure completely. The Court has 
consistently held that Paternity proceedings 
are civil. It is impossible to interchange 
these procedures between acts as they are 
entirely inconsistent. Using the criminal 
procedure of the Bastardy Act would violate 
-16-
78-45a-2 of the Uniform Act on Paternity. 
Also using the procedures of the Uniform Act 
on Paternity would violate 77-60-1 of the 
Bastardy Act. In each instance, suit could 
not be commenced since the action was not 
properly instituted. Under these circum-
stances the Court would not have jursidic-
-
J. 
tion to hear the matter. Thus an irreconci ble :L· 
conflict has arisen between the two statutes, 
and pursuant to the holding in Shondel, supra, 
-the latter Uniform Act on Paternity prevails. 
In addition, the criminal processes uti-
lized in the Bastardy Act are clearly not to 
be used in this type of action because had the 1 
legislature wanted criminal procedures, they 
could have included it in the new law. Rather, 
they have adopted the Uniform Act on Paternity 
supra, with its wholly civil procedures. Thus·: 
they impliedly repealed the irreconcible pro-
cedures of the Bastardy Act. 
-17-
B. An additional fact in support of the ,. 
repeal of the Bastardy Statute is specific 
statutory language. 78-45a-15 Of the Uniform 
Act on Paternity, U.C.A. (1953) states: 
"This act shall be so interpreted 
and construed to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law 
of these states which inact it. 11 
Of the three other states which adopted 
this act, two, Mississippi and Kentucky, have 
repealed the Bastardy Act. The Mississippi 
Bastardy Act was similar to ours. 4 Miss. 
Code 383 (1943) et. seq., provided for crimina 
procedures prior to District Court proceedings 
That act was specifically repealed by the 
adoption of the Uniform Act on Paternity. 
4 Miss. Code 383-01 (Supp.) (1942). The re-
peal in the new act in Kentucky can be found 
at 60. K.R.S. 406 et. seq .. Therefore, to 
effectuate the purposes of the act the legis-
lature must have intended the Bastardy Act to 
be repealed so as to be uniform throughout the 
states adopting said Uniform Act. 
-, . 
. ! 
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C. In addition, 78-45a-17 of the Uniform 
Act on Paternity, U.C.A. (1953) states that 
"this act applies to all cases of birth out of 
wedlock as defined in this act where birth 
occurrs after this act takes effect." This is. 
a clear statement by the legislature that the , 
Uniform Act on Paternity should be used in all'. 
cases arising after its enactment. It shows 
that the legislature intended the outdated and 
needless bulk of the Bastardy Act proceedings 
were to give way to the more rational approach 
of the Uniform Act on Paternity. 
In order to effectuate the better admin-
istration of justice, Appellant respecfully 
requests this Court to declare the irreconcibl 1 
terms of the Bastardy Act repealed by impli-
cation. 
POINT III 
A TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER 
WAS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WITB-
OUT ITS AUTHENTICITY BEING ESTAB-
LISHED WHICH RESULTED IN PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR AND APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
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Without respect to their admissibility, 
letters and telegrams are subject to the gen-
eral rules of evidence, and to various rules 
relating to documentary evidence. Baker vs. 
Glennwood Mining Co., 82 Utah 100, 21P. 2d 889c 
Corpus Juris 2d., Evidence Sec. 357. Proof 
must be made preliminarily that the proferred 
writing is authentic and that the party agains~ 
whom it is offered is in some way connected 
with it by having written it, received it or 
acted pursuant to its contents. Murdock vs. 
Farrell, 49 Utah 314, 163 P. 1102 (1907); 
Anderson vs. Thomas, 108 Utah 52 (1945), 159 P 
2d 142. 
A. 78-25-9 U.C.A. (1953) states the man-
ner in which writings may be proved: 
"Any writing may be proved either: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
By anyone who saw the writing 
executed; or, 
By evidence of the genuineness of 
the handwriting of the maker; or, 
By a subscribing witness." 
c 
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The letter purported to have been written : 
by Appellant was not a~thenticated in any of tr. 
above ways. There was no testimony of anyone 
who saw Appellant execute the writing, the let-: 
ter was typewritten and unsigned and the re- G. 
spondent did not produce a subscribing witness. 
Therefore, the letter should have been exclude( 
Continental Baking Co. vs. Katz, 68 C. 2d 512~ 
67 Cal. Rpt. 761, 439 P. 2d 889. 
2. A proper foundation must be laid for 
the admission of documentary evidence, that isC· 
the identity and authenticity of the document 
must be reasonably established as a pre-requi-
si te to its admission into evidence. Jones 
on Evidence, Vol. 3 pg. 1044. 
The only evidence offered to prove that 
Appellant wrote the subject letter is a smudge 
post-mark and an accusation that the letter 
contained information that only the Appellant 
could have known. 
"! 
-21-
In 9 A.L.R. 984, it is stated that the 
authorities generally concede that under pro-
per facts and circumstances the aut~enticity 
or genuineness of a letter may be established 
by indirect or circumstantial evidence, without.! 
resort to proof of handwriting or typewriting. 
Among other things upon which reliance may be 
' 
placed is that a letter states facts which coul.1 
I 
only be known to or relate to the purported 
writer. 
This rule requires a showing of informatic: 
contained in the letter which would only have 
been known to the author. Respondent made no 
such showing. The letter contains information 
'' 
'r 
known to both the prosecutrix and the Appellan· ~ 
,I 
thus, authentication was not accomplished. 
! 
Further, the post-mark on the letter was ·t 
i 
smudged, not legible. Alone, the post-mark ev!I 
if legible would not be suffifient to authen- _! 
ticate the document. Reynolds vs. Hinricks, t 
16 S.D. 602, 94N.W. 644- Jones on Evidence, : ~ 
pg. 1205. 
" 
J 
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Therefore, the letter was improperly 
admitted into evidence. 
3. Admitting the letter into evidence 
and allowing the jury to take it into the 
jury room for reference and analipis was pre-
judicial error. In Joseph vs. Groves Latter-
day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P. 2d 
q~5, the court held: 
"The burden is upon the appellant 
not only to show that there was error, 
but that it was prejudicial to the ex-
tent that there is reasonable likeli-
hood that in its.absence there would 
have been a aifferent result." 
In the Joseph case, supra, the court four 
error but reuled it was harmless error. Admit-
ting the letter into evidence was not harmless 1 
error. The letter states that its author is 
the child's father. When allowed into evidence 
it was an admission by the author of his guilt 
and by admitting it as evidence Appellant was 
deemed the author. The letter was enough stand-
ing alone to convict the Appellant. 
If the letter had not been admitted, AppE 
lant would not have been convicted. The only 
,.-; 
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testimony which accused Appellant of being the· 
father was that of the prosecutrix. In addi- , 
tion, the evidence is contradictory as to 
whether Appellant was with prosecutrix during: 
the period of gestation, as it was proved by 
Appellant that he was attending school some 
316 miles from the home of prosecutrix. Also 
Appellant established that during the period 
of gestation, prosecutrix had opportunity to 
be with men who might have fathered her child.· 
Therefore, Appellant would not have been 
convicted if the letter had not been admitted 
into evidence. 
Therefore, Appellant respectfully request 1: 
the court to dismiss his conviction since the ' 
admission into evidence of the letter was im-
proper and resulted in prejudicial error and 
in his conviction. 
POINT IV 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH SHOWED 
THAT PROSECUTRIX HAD AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO HA VE SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH MEN 
OTHER THAN APPELLANT EXCEPT FOR A 
_J 
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ONE MONTH PERIOD WAS ERRONIOUS 
AND PREJUTIICIAL ERROR RESULTED. 
A. Evidence of prosecutrix's sexual rela-
tions with men other than Appellant during the 
period of conception is permissible. 
"In paternity proceedings, refusal 
to permit plaintiff to be asked when 
testifying as an adverse witnes~ under 
the code of civil procedure, whether 
she had sexual relations with other men 
during period of which she conceived, 
was error. croset vs. Page, 147 C.A. 
2d 385, 305 P. 2d 121. 
In the Croset case the court found that 
conception took place on the night of June 14, 
1952. Nevertheless, the court found that evi-
dence of sexual relations of prosecutrix with 
men other than Appellant should have been ad-
mitted for the period in which prosecutrix 
could have become pregnant. The court in the 
present case limited the period of time for 
which such evidence may be introduced to one 
month, October 15, to November 15. Based upon 
the holding in the Croset case, the court 
should have allowed such evidence for a period 
in which conception may have taken place. The 
! ,, 
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court in the Croset case found that period to . 
be two months. 
Appellant has the right but not the burdE 
of showing that prosecutrix had such relationc 
with other men during or about the time when i, 
the ordinary course of nature the child must 
have been received. Berry vs. Chaplin, 169 P. 
2d 442 (1942) 
In the Berry case, supra, the court found.: 
I 
the period of gestation to be two months. 
The period of gestation is that period in 
'I 
11 
which presecutrix can conceive. The only test1~ 
j 
imony establishing the period of gestation is ~ 
I 
that of the doctor and the prosecutrix. The 
doctor's opinion is based upon the prosecutrix~ 
statement to him of the date of her last perio 1 j 
~ Therefore, the doctor was relying upon prosecu·:: 
trix's opinion of when she was able to get prei~ ~ 
nant. Obviously, prosecutrix's will pick the ~ 
date that collaborates her complaint. ,, 
In light of the Croset and Chaplin cases, ~ 
a period of two months would be reasonable. ,"' 
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Further, testimony other than prosecutrix's as 
to the period of gestation is lacking. In viev 
of the above, the trial court was not correct 
in limiting the period of gestation to one 
month. 
B. The exclusion of evidence showing 
that prosecutrix had sexual intercourse within 
the period of gestation with other men was pre-
judicial error. 
The Joseph case, supra, requires that a1 
error to be prejudicial must be such that if 
it had not been committed defendant would not 
have been convicted. If Appellant had been 
allowed to inquire beyond the one month period: 
he would have introduced evidence tending to 
establish that prosecutrix had sexual inter-
course with other men in November and in Octo-
ber and late September. The introduction of 
this evidence would have required that pro-
secutrix bear a greater burden in proving that 
Appellant was in fact the father, which burden 
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plaintiff did not bear. Therefore, the exclu-
sion of such evidence was prejudicial error. 
Appellant requests the court to dismiss 
his conviction because the trial court erron-
iously excluded evidence which would have 
prevented his conviction. 
-28-
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests the 
Court to reverse the lower court on the 
following grounds: 
1. That appellant was denied his right 
of equal protection of the laws in that he 
was subject to both criminal and civil pro-
cedure rules while others in his class are 
subject to the who~ly civil procedures of the 
Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a-l et. seq., 
U.C.A. (1953). 
2. That sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Bas-
tardy Act 77-60, U.C.A~ (1953) as amended 
have been repealed by implication by the Uni-
form Act on Paternity 78-45a-l et. seq., 
U.C.A. (1953). 
3. That evidence tending to prove that 
prosecutrix had sexual relations with other 
men during the period of gestation was 
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errorneously excluded by the lower court. 
4. That a letter alleged by respondent 
to have been written by the Appellant and 
admitting the authori's guilt was erroneously 
admitted into evidenceo 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
DARWIN C. FISHER 
PICKETT BUILDING 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
